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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article offers an Irish perspective on the market for corporate
control (MCC), which plays a fundamental role in corporate governance
theory. The MCC was first proposed by Henry Manne in a short article in
the Journal of Political Economy in 1965.1 He argued that inefficient
management2 in listed companies is reflected in decreases in share prices
as discontented shareholders sell their shares rather than replace management.3 An opportunity thus arises for third parties to acquire these
companies cheaply, replace the inefficient managers, and turn the companies around. As a result, “the lower the stock price, relative to what it
could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company
more efficiently.”4 The emphasis of the article—entitled Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control—was on the antitrust implications of the
MCC.5 But Manne noted that “the analysis . . . has important implications for a variety of economic questions[,]” particularly those relating to
the separation of ownership and control in large corporations.6 Manne
argued that while one motivation for a merger might be the diminution of
*
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1. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965).
2. Manne never completely dealt with the question of what constitutes “efficient management”
in the article, although he did note, when considering the benefits of the MCC and its contribution to
efficiency, that “apart from the stock market, we have no objective standard of managerial efficiency.” Id. at 113.
3. Id. at 112.
4. Id. at 113.
5. See George J. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176
(1955). Manne refers to this article, which examines mergers through a competition lens emphasizing the economic cost of decreased competition.
6. Manne, supra note 1, at 112.
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competition—a goal that involves social costs—a more likely motivation
is the desire to improve corporate management.7 Manne thus claimed that
“the potential return from the successful takeover and revitalization of a
poorly run company can be enormous.”8
A consequence of this potential value, Manne explained, is that the
MCC acts as an important constraint on management behavior in circumstances where the owners, as Berle and Means suggested,9 lack appreciable control. He claimed that “only the take-over scheme provides some
assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and
thereby affords strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of
small, non-controlling shareholders.”10 It also affords shareholders
“strong power,”11 which, it has been noted, stands in marked contrast to
the prevailing characterization, at the time Manne was writing, of shareholders as “chumps . . . routinely, and so predictably, bamboozled by
managers supposedly advancing shareholder welfare but really maximising their own welfare.”12 Although Manne referred in the article to the
replacement of inefficient managers, it is also clear that the MCC may
exert a disciplinary effect by encouraging managers to improve their performance in order to avoid a takeover and the subsequent loss of employment.
Like much of Manne’s work, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control has been described quite correctly as “ground-breaking,”13
“revolutionary,”14 and “pioneering.”15 Roberta Romano argued that the
article marked “the intellectual origin of what would become the new
paradigm for corporate law.”16 She noted how Manne’s contribution
achieved recognition following advances in modern finance,17 new research methodologies,18 the economic theories of the firm,19 and the ad7. Id. at 113.
8. Id.
9. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE
PROPERTY 69 (1932).
10. Manne, supra note 1, at 113.
11. Id. at 112.
12. Fred S. McChesney, Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 245, 249 (1999).
13. Daniel Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1978).
14. McChesney, supra note 12, at 246.
15. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 343
(2005).
16. Id.; see also William J. Carney, The Legacy of “The Market for Corporate Control” and
the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999).
17. Romano, supra note 15, at 344–45.
18. Id. at 346.
19. Id. at 347.
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vent of the hostile takeover era.20 In 1984, John Coffee wrote, “[T]he
claim that hostile takeovers generate a disciplinary force that constrains
managerial behavior cannot seriously be disputed.”21 From the 1980s
onward, the MCC was adopted by corporate law scholars examining how
the legal system should respond to those developments and challenges.22
Manne’s contribution continues to stimulate and influence new generations of scholars; Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control is currently ranked as the twenty-ninth most cited law review article of all
time, and it remains the most cited corporate law article.23
An acceptance of the value of the MCC has led many scholars to
advocate managerial passivity in the face of premium tender offers.
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, in their seminal 1981 article The
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
noted that “[t]he tender bidding process polices managers whether or not
a tender offer occurs, and disciplines or replaces them if they stray too
far from the service of the shareholders.”24 Describing this as “the most
powerful check on agency costs,” they concluded that the prevailing legal rules allowing the target’s management to engage in defensive tactics
in response to a tender offer decreases shareholders’ welfare.25 Although
the U.S. courts did not adopt such a restrictive approach, Romano suggested that this literature constituted “one of many factors affecting
courts’ perception of takeovers, and, in particular, the Delaware Supreme
Court’s 1985 revision of the fiduciary standard applicable in the hostile
takeover context.”26 Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control has
also had a profound effect on public policy both in the United States and
beyond. As discussed further below, it formed part of the rationale put
forward in support of regulation promoting an unconstrained and active
takeover market in the European Union at a national and supranational
level.
In an ever-changing legal and economic environment, it is incumbent on us to subject all such premises to scrutiny in order to consider
their continued application. This Article considers the effect of the MCC
on the management of Irish credit institutions in the run-up to the finan20. Id. at 347–48.
21. John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of
the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1294 (1984).
22. Romano, supra note 15, at 343.
23. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1490 (2012).
24. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1981).
25. Id. at 1196.
26. Romano, supra note 15, at 349.
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cial crisis. Part II sets the background by explaining how the MCC has
become an integral part of takeover regulation in Europe. The weaknesses in the efficient market hypothesis, which underlie the MCC and are
summarized in Part III, appear not to have undermined the theory’s credibility in the minds of public policy makers in Europe. Part IV explains
the background of the financial crisis in Ireland, and Part V considers the
effect of the MCC on management of Irish credit institutions in the runup to this crisis. A number of reports on the causes of the crisis in Ireland
have identified corporate governance failures and, in particular, poor risk
management and inappropriate remuneration structures in the years leading up to the crisis. These findings are consistent with similar studies of
the financial crisis commissioned in other jurisdictions across the world.
A concern is that this mismanagement does not appear to have been reflected in reduced share prices as the MCC would have predicted. In fact,
the opposite occurred—share prices in credit institutions soared. 27 This
Article argues not only that the MCC did not have the anticipated disciplinary effect on management, but also that it may have had the opposite
effect. It appears as if certain boards may have acted recklessly in order
to maintain share prices to stave off takeover bids.
II. DIRECTIVE 2004/25/EC ON TAKEOVER BIDS
The impact of the MCC theory on European takeover policy may
have been even more profound than its influence in the United States.
This may be explained in part by the significant influence exerted on European takeover regulation by the U.K. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers
(U.K. Panel) through its City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the
Code). Historically, the U.K. market for takeovers constituted over 50%
of the whole E.U. market for corporate control,28 and the U.K. Panel,
established in 1968, possesses unrivalled experience of takeovers and
acknowledged expertise in the field of takeover regulation.29 In 1974, the
European Commission (Commission) invited Professor Pennington, a
U.K. company law expert, to produce a proposal for a draft directive on

27. See RANU DAYAL ET AL., LIVING WITH NEW REALITIES: CREATING NEW VALUE IN
BANKING 2009 (2009), available at http://www.bcg.com/documents/file15429.pdf. The share prices
of financial institutions worldwide did not begin to decline until mid-2007 and the decline then
became most dramatic in the third quarter of 2008.
28. MARCCUS PARTNERS, THE TAKEOVER BIDS DIRECTIVE ASSESSMENT REPORT 285 (2012),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf
(noting that since the financial crisis, the number of takeovers in the United Kingdom has declined
whilst the number in continental Europe has remained relatively stable).
29. See Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on
the City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422 (2007).
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takeovers.30 Many of the proposal’s features are modeled on the Code.
One of these is the board-neutrality rule, which is reflected in the Code’s
general principle that shareholders should not be denied an opportunity
to decide on the merits of a takeover,31 and the rule that boards of offeree
companies are prohibited from defending a bid unless shareholder approval is granted.32 Although offeree company boards may mount a robust defense33 or seek a white knight,34 they are not permitted to unilaterally frustrate a bid.35
The Commission published the first draft directive in 1989,36 but
agreement on the substance and even the form of this legislation proved
extremely difficult due to the significant differences between member
states’ capital markets, corporate governance regimes, and political cultures.37 Following intense negotiations at the European Council Working
Group38 and at the Commission,39 the Commission in 2001 compiled and
submitted a directive to the European Parliament.40 This proposal contained a board-neutrality rule that would have restricted defensive actions
performed by the board without the prior authorization from the shareholders.41 The restriction would have applied at least from the time the
board became aware of the decision to make an offer or, if member states

30. See ROBERT R. PENNINGTON, REPORT ON TAKEOVERS AND OTHER BIDS (1974).
31. General Principle 3 states, “The Code is designed principally to ensure that shareholders in
an offeree company are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of a
takeover and that shareholders in the offeree company of the same class are afforded equivalent
treatment by an offeror.” PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS
AND MERGERS, gen. princ. 3 (10th ed. 2011).
32. Id. r. 21.
33. The defense would be subject, of course, to compliance with the City Code including, for
example, rule 19, which imposes a high standard of care and regulates documents, advertisements,
interviews, debates, and other materials and interactions.
34. This is subject to rule 20.2, which ensures a degree of equality of information for competing offerors.
35. Simon Deakin & Ajit Singh, The Stock Market, the Market for Corporate Control and the
Theory of the Firm: Legal and Economic Perspectives and Implications for Public Policy, in THE
MODERN FIRM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENTS 12–13 (Bjuggren, P. O. & Mueller,
D. eds., 2008), available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP365.pdf (noting that related aspects of
company and securities law in the United Kingdom, such as statutory preemption rights and the
proper-purpose rule, also prevent certain potentially defensive behaviors by corporate boards).
36. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and
Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8.
37. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to
Move Forward, para. 3.1, COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003).
38. The European Council Working Groups function as preparatory bodies for the Council of
Ministers and are comprised of national officials with expertise in the areas under discussion.
39. See 1996 O.J. (C 162) 5; see also 1997 O.J. (C 378) 10.
40. 2001 O.J. (C 23) 1.
41. Id. art. 9(1).
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required, as soon as the board became aware that an offer was imminent.
A tied vote ensued and the proposed directive was accordingly rejected
with the proposed board-neutrality rule receiving particular criticism.42
Parliamentarians appeared to be particularly concerned that this rule
would create an uneven playing field between the European Union and
the United States. The discrepancy would be on the basis of the broad
discretion afforded to the boards of American companies to utilize defensive devices pursuant to the business judgment rule, and also the stakeholder statutes that apply in many individual states.43
The Commission subsequently appointed a high-level group of
company law experts to consider the matters raised by Parliament.44 This
group opined that in the light of available economic evidence, the availability of a mechanism to facilitate takeover bids would be beneficial.45 It
cited three reasons for this: the exploitation of synergies, the opportunity
to sell at a premium on market price, and the market for corporate control.46 In relation to the latter point, the group noted that “actual and potential takeover bids are an important means to discipline the management of listed companies with dispersed ownership . . . . Such discipline
of management . . . is in the long term in the best interests of all stakeholders, and society at large.”47 Thus, the group concluded that “any regime which confers discretion on a board to impede or facilitate a bid
inevitably involves unacceptable cost and risk.”48 This acknowledgement
marks a resounding acceptance of the MCC. In response to the concern
that European companies would be detrimentally affected by the disparity of treatment of companies in the United States referred to above, the
group determined that the American approach was less likely to benefit
the development of efficient, integrated capital markets in Europe because the legal and capital market environment is significantly differ-

42. See JAAP WINTER ET AL., REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS
RELATED TO TAKEOVER BIDS (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf; see also Blanaid Clarke, The Takeovers
Directive: Is a Little Regulation Better Than No Regulation? 15 EUR. L.J. 174 (2009) (noting Parliament also argued that the protection for employees of companies involved in the bid was insufficient).
43. WINTER, supra note 42, at 39–42.
44. Press Release, Company Law: Commission Creates High Level Group of Experts (Apr. 9,
2001), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/1237&format=
HTML&aged=1&language=en&guiLanguage=en.
45. WINTER, supra note 42, at 19.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 21.
ON ISSUES
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ent.49 It specifically referred to the existence of greater pressure to enhance shareholder value on American boards from nonexecutive directors, investment banks and institutional investors, heightened media scrutiny, proxy contests, and a larger number of liability suits against directors because derivative actions are easier to bring and the judicial system
is better equipped to handle these issues.50 The group also noted that antitakeover rules are controversial even within the United States, and that
while some accept them as the outcome of regulatory competition among
the states and effective lobbying by the business community, there is a
large body of both economic and legal literature arguing that such rules
should be prohibited.51
In 2004, Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids (the Directive)
was finally passed.52 Although the board-neutrality rule was left in the
Directive, a compromise proposal by the Portuguese Presidency was included, thereby rendering the provision optional for member states53 and
also allowing member states to adopt a reciprocity rule.54 Nineteen of the
twenty-seven member states adopted the board-neutrality rule, although
its effect is somewhat diminished by the fact that five of these states opted to make reciprocity available.55 In its recent review of the Directive,
the Commission reported that the board-neutrality rule has been a “relative success”56 in terms of its implementation, and the Commission is not
proposing to make the rule mandatory.57 In coming to this conclusion,
the Commission relied on an assessment report on the Directive indicating that stakeholders found that the optional board-neutrality rule had

49. Id. at 40–42. The Group also noted that European companies have benefited from the intensive takeover activity in the United States, and that a number of defensive tactics are introduced
to protect shareholders from partial bids, which are not allowed in the Directive.
50. Id. at 41.
51. Id. at 42.
52. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC).
53. Id. art. 12.1. Member states may opt out of adopting the board-neutrality rule under article
9, but in such a case article 12.2 provides that they must allow individual companies to voluntarily
apply the rule. A similar compromise applies to the breakthrough rule applied in article 11 of the
Directive.
54. Id. art. 12.3. Member states may exempt companies that choose to opt in to the boardneutrality rule or the breakthrough rule to not apply the rule if they become the subject of a bid from
an offeror who has not applied the same rule.
55. Paul L. Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster & Emilie Van de Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool? 14 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
141/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616.
56. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Application of Directive
2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids, at 8, COM (2012) 347 final (June 28, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/COM2012_347_en.pdf.
57. Id. at 10.
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contributed to the openness of the European Union’s MCC,58 but that
there was “little appetite to change.”59 The report endorsed the MCC theory by accepting that “transfers of corporate control (takeovers) may result in a more efficient allocation of control if the offeror presents a
higher valuation of control because it is capable of using the pool of assets in the offeree company to generate greater value than the incumbent.”60 But the report concluded that the board-neutrality rule had only a
moderate economic impact: although it may have increased the incentives to make an offer by removing post-bid defenses, it may also have
reduced the potential premium paid by the offeror and encouraged incumbent shareholders to entrench before an offer is made.61
III. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
In finance, capital market efficiency is the notion that all available
information about a company is fully reflected in share price.62 The view
generally put forward is that markets are “semi-strong” in the sense that
prices adjust rapidly in response to fluctuations in public information.63
In Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Manne accepted that
“a fundamental premise” underlying the market for corporate control is
“the existence of a high positive correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of shares of that company.”64 He noted that there are “compelling reasons”65 for believing that this correlation
exists. He explained in a footnote:
Insiders, those who have the most reliable information about corporate affairs, are strongly motivated financially to perform a kind of
arbitrage function for their company’s stock. That is, given their
sense of what constitutes efficient management, they will cause
share prices to rise or decline in accordance with that standard.66

58. MARCCUS PARTNERS, supra note 28, at 209.
59. Id. at 355.
60. Id. at 320.
61. Id. at 357.
62. Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383, 383 (1970).
63. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakmann, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 70 VA. L.
REV. 549, 644 (1984).
64. Manne, supra note 1, at 112.
65. Id.
66. Id. Manne used the term “insiders” to refer to persons presently controlling the affairs of
the company. One way in which Manne suggested that insiders push share prices in the right direction is by insider dealing. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966). He also acknowledged the role of explicit public disclosure of information, sanctioned communication of information to financial analysts, and “derivative” trading, which occurs after some
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Manne continued by explaining that dealings by shareholders, or potential shareholders, operating without reliable information will be “randomly distributed,”67 yielding a neutral effect. On the other hand, dealing
by insiders will move the average market price of a company’s shares to
the “correct”68 one because they are not random.
In 2003, Lynn Stout noted that it was not necessary to have waited
several decades to develop the suspicion that “efficient market theory
fails, in some fundamental respect, to capture the reality of securities
markets.”69 Nor, she states, “need we have suffered through the [c]rash
of 1987 and the 1990s tech stock bubble to find enlightenment.”70 Stout
argues that the weaknesses of the efficient market theory were apparent
to anyone who cared to look for them. Within a few years after the theory was first developed and disseminated, “the trickle of legal articles
questioning the market’s efficiency had become a flood.”71
In the aftermath of the banking crisis in the United Kingdom, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Lord Turner, the Financial Services
Authority Chairman, to review and make recommendations for reforming U.K. and international approaches to banking regulations.72 The resulting report published in March 2009 stated that the assumptions underlying the efficient market theory have been subject to increasingly
effective criticism, “drawing on both theoretical and empirical arguments.”73 Behavioral economic theories suggest that the markets are vulnerable to socio-psychological factors such as herding, noise, and bubbles.74 As noted by Lord Turner, “[m]any market participants accept on
the basis of pragmatic observation that significant temporary bubbles in
market prices are possible.”75 Lord Turner concluded that there is also
evidence of pervasive and systemic biases in the marketplace,76 and that
form of “market signalling.” See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the
Dog That Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167 (2005).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 637 (2003).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 667; see also Nicholas Wolfson, Efficient Markets, Hubris, Chaos, Legal Scholarship
and Takeovers, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 511 (1989); Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, U.
ILL. L. REV. 253 (2005).
72. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL
BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
73. Id. at 40.
74. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005); Donald C. Langevoort,
The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 65
(2011).
75. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 72, at 40.
76. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC & AMOS TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986); Ronald
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policymakers have to recognize that “all liquid traded markets are capable of acting irrationally, and can be susceptible to self-reinforcing herd
and momentum effects.”77
A further weakness is evidenced by the inability of the efficient
market hypothesis to accommodate derivatives trading. The hypothesis
depends on an even flow of information through to the market, and experience has demonstrated that derivative trading can lead to information
asymmetries and ultimately price inefficiencies in the marketplace. An
example of such an asymmetry exists between informed contracts for
difference holders and uninformed investors.78 Manne’s explanation of
the MCC expressly assumes that insiders always have complete
knowledge, whereas the advent of derivatives trading has changed that.
Henry Hu recently argued that the twenty-first century financial system
is simply becoming “too complex to depict.”79
IV. THE IRISH BANKING EXPERIENCE
Ireland experienced one of the most catastrophic financial crises in
the developed world.80 In 2012, the cost to the taxpayers of bank recapitalization was estimated at approximately €64.1 billion ($80.4 billion)81
with expectations that this figure may continue to rise. In addition, writedowns of shareholder funds in the banks covered by the government
guarantee82 and write-downs of shareholder funds at the foreign banks
operating in Ireland were estimated at €29 billion ($36.4 billion) and €28
billion ($35.1 billion), respectively.83 Liability-management exercises
amounted to an additional €14 billion. To put those figures in context,
Gilson & Reinier Kraakmann, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader
Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 19 (1990).
77. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 72, at 41.
78. For example, the holder of a long contract for difference position will be aware, based on
market practice, that when the contract is closed out, there is likely to be ready access to the underlying securities. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE: FEEDBACK ON
CP08/17 AND FINAL RULES 7 (2009).
79. See Henry Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information” and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012).
80. See Blanaid Clarke & Niamh Hardiman, Crisis in the Irish Banking System (UCD Geary
Inst. Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2012/03, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2008302.
81. 772 DÁIL DEB. no. 1, at 86 (July 17, 2012), available at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/
2012/07/17/00086.asp.
82. See CREDIT INSTITUTIONS (ELIGIBLE LIABILITIES GUARANTEE) SCHEME 2009: DRAFT
SCHEME FOR THE GUARANTEE BY THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE OF ELIGIBLE LIABILITIES SUBJECT TO
THE APPROVAL OF THE OIREACHTAS (2009), http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications/
statutoryinstruments/2009/guaranttdraftsch09.pdf.
83. See Clarke & Hardiman, supra note 80.
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Ireland’s total gross domestic product in 2011 was €159 billion.84 Nearly
half of these losses are attributable to a single bank, Anglo Irish Bank,85
with most of the remaining losses being incurred by Ireland’s two oldest
banks: the Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank.86 All three banks, together with Irish Life and Permanent, a former building society, were
listed on the Irish and London Stock Exchanges. This means that theoretically they had broad shareholder bases and were thus exposed to the
MCC.
In an effort to understand the causes of Ireland’s banking crisis,
three reports have been produced at the bequest of the Irish government.
The first report was prepared by the Governor of the Central Bank, Patrick Honohan.87 The second report was prepared by Klaus Regling, a
German economist and current Chief Executive Officer of the European
Financial Stability Facility, together with Max Watson, previously a
senior adviser on economic and financial affairs at the European
Commission and Deputy Director in the IMF.88 The final report was
prepared by Peter Nyberg, a Finnish economist and previous Director
General of the Financial Markets Department in the Finnish Ministry of
Finance.89 While all three reports concluded that Ireland’s crisis bears the
clear imprint of global influences, the crisis was in crucial ways “homemade.”90 Unlike the United States or Britain, Ireland’s enormous banking
exposure did not stem from a proliferation of complex financial products
or exposure to the United States subprime mortgage market. Instead, Ireland’s banking crisis was described by Regling and Watson as
“a plain vanilla property bubble, compounded by exceptional concentrations of lending for purposes related to property and notably commercial
property.”91 So, while international pressures did contribute to the timing, intensity, and depth of the Irish banking crisis, the essential characteristic of the problem was domestic and classic.92
84. CENT. STATISTICS OFFICE, MEASURING IRELAND’S PROGRESS 17 (2012).
85. Anglo Irish Bank (along with the Irish Nationwide Building Society) is now re-titled Irish
Bank Resolution Corporation Limited.
86. 772 DÁIL DEB., no. 1, at 86.
87. See PATRICK HONOHAN ET AL., THE IRISH BANKING CRISIS: REGULATORY AND FINANCIAL
STABILITY POLICY (2010), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24896/1/MPRA_paper
_24896.pdf.
88. See KLAUS REGLING & MAX WATSON, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE SOURCES OF
IRELAND’S BANKING CRISIS (2010), available at http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/Preliminary
%20Report%20into%20Ireland’s%20Banking%20Crisis%2031%20May%202010.pdf.
89. See PETER NYBERG, COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE BANKING SECTOR IN
IRELAND (2011), available at http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/.
90. REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 5; see also HONOHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 134;
NYBERG, supra note 89, at 96–99.
91. REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 6.
92. HONOHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 22.
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A number of macroeconomic conditions played a role in triggering
Ireland’s banking crisis. Ireland’s use of the euro brought access to cheap
finance both for the banks and for their customers.93 Demand for credit
was particularly high amongst builders and property developers.94 Competition between the Irish lending institutions, including the nondomestic
banks, intensified. As they desperately sought to hold their share of the
rapidly expanding market, new lending instruments such as tracker mortgages and 100% loans were offered, and the loan approval processes became more streamlined.95 Anglo Irish Bank, for example, was proud of
its reputation as “a relationship lender” and went to great lengths to accommodate its top clients.96 Nyberg characterized the environment as
one in which the supply of credit available exceeded demand for goodquality loans.97 The three-fold increase in average real-property prices
from 1994 to 2006 was described by Honohan as “the highest in any advanced economy in recent times,”98 and one which, “long before it
peaked,
looked
unsustainable
to
most
commentators.”99
As Anglo’s profits increased, and as it was rewarded by staggering
growths in its share price, the larger and traditionally more conservative
banks—Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank—came under increasing
pressure to relax their own loan-approval and risk-assessment practices in order to keep pace.100
A further contributing factor to the Irish crisis was the existence of
significant corporate governance failures. Because of the small marketplace, significant groupthink and lack of diversity on the boards appear
to have exacerbated the problem.101 Regling and Watson identified four
key areas in which poor bank management and governance contributed
to the Irish banking crisis. First, management failed to appreciate the risk
entailed by the significant concentration of bank assets in activities related to property, and especially non-household-based commercial property. Property-related lending grew by 29.4% and speculative commercial
and property lending grew by an average of 56.5% each year between

93. REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 12.
94. NYBERG, supra note 89, at 20.
95. Id. at 21. “Tracker mortgages” are mortgages whose rates vary in accordance with the
European Central Bank base interest rate.
96. Id. at 32. This was driven not merely by a desire to demonstrate loyalty to old customers
but also by the fear that such customers would find the finance from their banking competitors.
97. Id.
98. HONOHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 24.
99. Id.; see also Patrick Honohan, Resolving Ireland’s Banking Crisis, 40 ECON. & SOC. REV.
207 (2009).
100. NYBERG, supra note 89, at 34–35.
101. Id. at 86.

2013]

The Market for Corporate Control

589

2002 and 2007.102 Domestic-property lending represented 80% of all
growth in credit.103 Second, lending guidelines and processes appear to
have been widely circumvented.104 Third, poor remuneration policies that encouraged and rewarded risk-taking were tolerated.
For instance, in 2007, the Chief Executive of Anglo Irish Bank, David
Drumm, received total remuneration for the year of €3.3 million including a €2 million bonus.105 Drumm’s Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish
Bank counterparts received €2.97 million and €2.1 million, respectively.106 The Anglo Irish Bank Chairman, Sean Fitzpatrick, received fees of
€431,000 that year, and the total package for the fourteen members of the
board was €9.63 million.107 The fourth failure involved “very specific
and serious breaches of basic governance principles”108 concerning identifiable transactions in specific institutions including undisclosed loans to
directors, creative accounting, and loans to investors to purchase
bank shares.109 In considering the reaction of the market to these four
failings, it is important to note that only the last one would not have been
outwardly evident to the public.
V. THE OPERATION OF THE MCC IN THE IRISH BANKING SECTOR
Before examining the market’s reactions to the aforementioned
corporate governance failings, it is necessary to consider the nature of the
market for corporate control in Ireland. Share ownership in Ireland is
relatively widely dispersed, and the level of takeover activity is reasonably high.110 As the table below demonstrates, since 1997, there has been
an average of 5.3 takeovers per year from an annual average of seventyfive relevant companies. In that time, there have been only seven hostile
takeover offers (an average of 0.5 per year), and none of these takeovers
have been successful. In four of the bids, a preferred bidder ultimately
acquired the targets, and in the remaining three bids, control did not pass
and the targets remained independent. In two of the latter instances,
competition issues may have caused a significant barrier to the acquisition.
102. Id. at 17.
103. Id. at 14.
104. See id. at 96–97; REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 35.
105. ANGLO IRISH BANK, ANNUAL REPORTS & ACCOUNTS 126 (2007), available at
http://www.ibrc.ie/About_us/Financial_information/Archived_reports/Annual_Report_2007.pdf.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 35.
109. Id. at 35, 36.
110. MARCCUS PARTNERS, supra note 28, at 284 (noting a significant decrease in takeovers in
Europe in the aftermath of the financial crisis, with the average value of deals in 2010 reduced to the
level in 2003 and an even greater decrease in the number of deals).
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Figure 1: Level of Takeover Activity in Ireland111
Year End

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

“Takeovers” Number
Number of
Supervised
of Hostile Relevant
(Number of Bids
Companies
Companies
Involved)
5
0
78
7 (6)
1
80
8 (7)
1
77
8
0
79
7 (6)
1
76
9
0
67
4 (3)
0
64
2
0
66
3
0
82
8
1
83
9
0
81
1
1
79
8(7)
2
75
4 (3)
0
70

Percentage of
Companies
subjected to a
Bid
6.4%
7.5%
9.1%
10.1%
7.9%
13.4%
4.7%
3.0%
3.6%
9.6%
11.1%
1.2%
9.3%
4.3%

The Irish Takeover Panel is the supervisory authority responsible
for monitoring takeovers of relevant Irish companies. It took over this
role from the London Panel, which monitored Irish companies until
1997.112 The Takeover Rules of the 1997 Irish Takeover Panel Act,
though in statutory form, are derived from the City Code and are very
similar in substance. Rule 21 of the Irish Takeover Rules sets out a
board-neutrality rule that, like its U.K. counterpart, requires shareholder
approval for actions that might frustrate a takeover or deprive shareholders of the opportunity to consider a bid.113 When implementing the Take-

111. The data in figure 1 was compiled from the Irish Takeover Panel’s annual reports from
1997 to 2011, which are available at http://www.irishtakeoverpanel.ie/about/annual-reports/. “Relevant companies” primarily include Irish registered companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange, the
London Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq. See Irish Takeover Panel Act
1997 § 2 (Act No. 5/1997) (as amended by § 75 of the Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act in 2005 and § 26 of the Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act in 2006), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/1997/en.act.1997.0005.pdf.
The term “takeover” is defined in the 1997 Irish Takeover Panel Act and includes schemes of arrangement.
112. Blanaid Clarke, The Irish Takeover Panel Act, 1997: A Further Cutting of the UK Regulatory Ties, in 1 PALMER’S COMPANY LAW 1 (Geoffrey Morse ed., 1998).
113. Takeover Rules 2007 r. 21, Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997.
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overs Directive in 2006,114 Ireland also maintained its position on neutrality and did not adopt the reciprocity rule. Thus, it can be said that Ireland, too, seeks to ensure an unconstrained takeover market. The Irish
Panel, as required by the Directive, also applies a mandatory-bid rule.115
This means that an acquisition of securities that leads to the acquirer,
together with any concert party, holding 30% or more of securities conferring voting rights in the company triggers an obligation to make a bid
for the entire share capital.116
Control structures and barriers to takeovers, such as pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings, are uncommon in Ireland and not covered
by the Directive. National competition law would have been a factor in
deterring the main Irish credit institutions from launching takeover bids
for each other. E.U. merger controls could have been seen as a barrier to
acquisitions from related institutions. Sectorial regulation may also have
been a consideration, as prior notification to, and approval of, the Central
Bank, and in certain cases the Minister for Finance, is required for proposals to acquire specific holdings in Irish banks.117 A holding of 10% of
the total shares or of the total voting rights attaching to shares would typically fall within the scope of this requirement,118 although the Central
Bank may exempt such a transaction if it is entered into with the Central
Bank’s prior approval “in the interests of the proper and orderly regulation of banking or financial markets in the State.”119 It is submitted that
despite these regulatory restrictions, the Irish banks would still have been
subject to the MCC.
Applying the MCC to the Irish credit-institution market suggests
that the share prices of the listed institutions should have dropped to reflect their increasingly poor risk management and corporate governance,
and consequently the institutions should have been acquired and improved. Yet, as figure 2 below demonstrates, this did not happen. Profits
in the four banks, and Anglo Irish Bank in particular, grew significantly.
Demand for shares grew, and from January 2000 to its peak in February
2007, the combined market capitalization of the four banks rose from
€20.4 billion to €57.4 billion. In this period, Anglo’s market capitalization grew over 2,000% from €0.6 billion in early 2000 to a peak of €13.3
billion in mid-2007.

114. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC).
115. Id. art. 5.
116. Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997 r. 9.
117. See The Central Bank Act 1989 (Act No. 16/1989) (Ir.), available at http://www.irish
statutebook.ie/1989/en/act/pub/0016/index.html.
118. Id. § 74.
119. Id. § 75(2).
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Figure 2: Individual Market Capitalizations of Listed Covered Banks
2000–January 2009120

It seems clear from a study of these prices that shareholders did not
desert the Irish banks in droves as Manne predicted. Instead, they increased their level of investment, thereby driving share prices upward. It
was only when “the music”121 stopped in mid-2007 that interbank
lending slowed down and share prices began to decline due to market
fears of overexposure to potential losses on high-risk U.S. mortgages.
Then the Northern Bank run in September 2007,122 its nationalization in
February 2008,123 followed by the failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in July 2008,124 led market analysts and credit-rating agencies to
express concern about the stability of the banks.125 Lehman Brothers
collapsed in September 2008,126 and the share prices of credit institutions
120. NYBERG, supra note 89, at 14 (listing the Irish Stock Exchange as its source).
121. Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-outs, FIN.
TIMES (July 9, 2007), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-0000779fd2ac.html
# axzz29PQ62D2S.
122. Press Release, Bank of Eng., Liquidity Support Facility for Northern Rock Plc (Sept. 14,
2007), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2007/090.htm.
123. Northern Rock, H.M. TREASURY, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_stability_nr.htm
(last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
124. See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers on Conservatorship (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Documents/fhfa_consrv_faq_090708hp1128.pdf.
125. HONOHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 159, 160.
126. Press Release, Lehman Brothers, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Announces It Intends to
File Chapter 11 Bankrupcy Petition; No Other Lehman Brothers’ U.S. Subsidiaries or Affiliates,
Including Its Broker-Dealer and Investment Management Subsidiaries Are Included in the Filing
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across the world tumbled.127 The markets determined that Anglo Irish
Bank was particularly exposed.128 A March 2008 report by analyst Philip
Ingram of Merrill Lynch identified Anglo Irish Bank as the bank with the
greatest credit risk to the bursting U.K. commercial-property market.129
Days later, the Lex column in the Financial Times suggested that “nobody wants to have anything to do with banks with commercial property
exposure (Anglo Irish Bank and HBOS).”130 At this stage, investors
started to sell their shares in significant numbers.131
Interestingly, the management of many of the institutions, the socalled “insiders,” did not appear to engage in conduct to push the share
prices toward the “correct” price as Manne had predicted. In fact, the
signals suggested that the market price represented good value for potential investors as many directors invested heavily in their own firms. For
example, between September 2007 and September 2008, David Drumm
increased his shareholding in Anglo Irish Bank from 510,899 to
1,013,556 shares. Sean Fitzpatrick increased his holding from 4,512,712
to 4,909,429 shares during the same period.132 In the twelve months leading up to September 2007, David Drumm had increased his holding by
205,379 shares and Sean Fitzpatrick by 38,843 shares.133
The level of takeovers in Europe experienced an upward trend from
2003 to 2007 both in terms of value and number.134 But it has been a
long-acknowledged fact that the discipline of the capital market is only
effective within a limited range.135 John Coffee, commenting on the
MCC, pointed out that the level of risk required to accept a financially
distressed company is high. Poorly managed companies may be perceived as carrying excessive risk and may thus become indigestible.136 In
other words, these businesses are immune from attack precisely because
of their pervasive inefficiency.137 This was of course true in the aftermath
(Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/091508_lbhi_chapter11_
announce.pdf.
127. Larry Elliot et al., Nightmare on Wall Street, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/16/marketturmoil.lehmanbrothers.
128. HONOHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 123.
129. Michael Lewis, When Irish Eyes Are Crying, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2011.
130. European Banks, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8c29bd5af48c-11dc-aaad-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2JIyzfkeG.
131. HONOHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 157.
132. ANGLO IRISH BANK, ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS (2008), available at
http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/2009/anglo/index.pdf.
133. ANGLO IRISH BANK, ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS (2007), available at
http://www.ibrc.ie/About_us/Financial_information/Archived_reports/Annual_Report_2007.pdf.
134. MARCCUS PARTNERS, supra note 28, at 284.
135. Coffee, supra note 21, at 1200.
136. Id. at 1203, 1204.
137. Id. at 1204.
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of the crisis.138 But until 2007–2008, there did not seem to be a public
perception that the Irish banks were badly managed. For example, in
January 2007, the international management-consultancy firm Oliver
Wyman named Anglo Irish Bank “the world’s best bank” in the year of
2006.139
A further complication for Anglo Irish Bank arose in the form of a
significant undisclosed contract for differences (CFD) holding in the
company. The Anglo “insiders” described themselves as “physically
shocked” when they finally discovered in September 2007 that one of
their lending clients, Sean Quinn, had invested in CFDs relating to at
least 25% of Anglo’s share capital.140 At the time, neither Irish nor E.U.
law required public disclosure of these holdings, and the company was in
no better position than the market to identify this “hidden” owner or determine the scale of his holding.
In addition to the failure of the MCC to lead to inefficient companies being taken over, it is argued that the MCC failed in another way.
One of the three government-commissioned reports on the banking crisis,
the Nyberg Report, was given the express mandate to examine why a
number of public and private institutions had acted in an imprudent or
ineffective manner during the period spanning January 1, 2003, to January 15, 2009.141 After discussing the intense market-share competition
between domestic and foreign banks and the growth in lending, especially to the property market, Nyberg noted,
It was against this backdrop that the covered banks pursued strategies which would lead to higher growth, higher reported profits and
higher bank valuations. A primary reason appears to have been to
prevent a predatory takeover by another bank (either domestic or
foreign) and thus maintain independence.142
...
The strategies of the two bigger banks [Allied Irish Bank and Bank
of Ireland] included a desire to maintain their independence. To
drive share price growth, and thereby increase their market capitali138. Indeed, it has been reported that Irish Nationwide had been on the market since 2007 and
that in the hours leading up to the government’s guarantee on September 30, 2008, Anglo Irish Bank
approached AIB and Bank of Ireland to determine their interest in merging with or acquiring the
company. See SIMON CARSWELL, ANGLO REPUBLIC: INSIDE THE BANK THAT BROKE IRELAND 193,
214 (2011).
139. Joseph Cotterill, World’s Best Bank (2006 Vintage), FIN. TIMES BLOG (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/02/11/485311/worlds-best-bank-2006-vintage/.
140. See BRIAN CAREY & TOM LYONS, THE FITZPATRICK TAPES 115 (2011).
141. NYBERG, supra note 89, at 1.
142. Id. at 21. Nyberg concluded that an additional reason in a number of cases was “professional pride and a desire to catch up with or stay ahead of the competition (i.e. playing to win).”
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sations, it was felt that banks needed to show sufficiently strong
growth in earnings and at least maintain market share. Strong market capitalisations, in turn, somewhat protected the banks from
takeover by a domestic or foreign competitor . . . . Accordingly,
during the Period, strategies in both bigger banks evolved to allow
increased exposure to the commercial property market as this was a
sector that could provide for the significant loan growth required to
meet earnings targets.143

This finding is particularly troublesome in that it suggests that the MCC,
rather than acting as a disciplinary force, acted as a destabilizing force on
the management of potentially vulnerable companies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lord Turner’s findings regarding the disciplinary effect of the markets were generally equally negative. He opined:
But a strong case can be made that the events of the last five years
have illustrated the inadequacy of market discipline: indeed, they
suggest that in some ways market prices and market pressures may
have played positively harmful roles. . . . Bank share prices similarly failed to indicate that risks were increasing, but rather delivered
strong market price reinforcement to management’s convictions that
their aggressive growth strategies were value creative.144

This is consistent with research that has demonstrated the existence of
regulatory paradoxes where regulation “not only fails to change behaviour, manage risks or achieve any other stated goals, but actually produces the opposite effects from those intended.”145 If, as is argued here, a
case can be made that the MCC has negative, or at best neutral, effects
on the behavior of corporate boards, further thought needs to be given to
the potential effect such a determination has on financial regulation, corporate governance, and takeover regulation. A number of possible scenarios may be considered.
If corporate management acts inefficiently, but the market fails to
recognize this fact, the management will not be concerned with a hostile
bid because the share price will remain high. The MCC will simply not
operate, and regulators seeking to curb agency costs will need to look to
other forms of regulation. It is noticeable that credit institutions have become the subject of an increased number of mandatory corporate governance rules. In Ireland, for example, the Central Bank has introduced a
143. Id. at 24–25.
144. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 72, at 46.
145. Julia Black, Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial
Crisis, 75(6) M.L.R. 1037, 1039 (2012).
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corporate governance code with statutory effect for credit institutions and
insurance undertakings.146 At the E.U. level, new requirements govern
the remuneration of certain personnel of credit institutions and investment firms.147
Kurt Vonnegut famously observed that “a sane person to an insane
society must appear insane.”148 In this context, if management acts efficiently (namely, good corporate governance prevails and sound riskmanagement systems are applied) but this trait is not valued by the market, the management may correctly be concerned about a takeover from a
less scrupulous bidder. Such a bidder may acquire the company and seek
to engage in profitable, though not necessarily sustainable, behavior. The
perverse effects of the MCC may apply. At present, the Directive, the
City Code, and the Irish Takeover Rules allow the target board to mount
a robust defense to any action. As such, one might consider that if a
board refused to engage in short-term behavior and became the subject of
a hostile offer, the board could explain that it was concerned with preserving the long-term value of the company. While this might have some
effect in a securities-exchange offer, it would arguably be significantly
less persuasive in a cash bid. The company’s success in retaining its independence would then depend on persuading shareholders not to accept
what may be a sizable premium offer over market price. This may not be
easy. Shareholders may not be interested in arguments based on the
benefits to the company moving forward.
By way of example, one might consider the hostile takeover of
Cadbury PLC by Kraft Foods, Inc. in 2010.149 Vince Cable, the current
U.K. Business Secretary, complained that the decision to sell was made
by institutional shareholders whom he referred to as “short term investors
and financial gamblers [who] value a quick buck above all else.”150 By
the time the offer was finally recommended by the board, hedge funds

146. CENT. BANK OF IRELAND, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE FOR CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
UNDERTAKINGS (2010), available at http://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/poldocs/
consultation-papers/Documents/CP41%20-%20Corporate%20Governance%20Requirements/Corpor
ate%20Governance%20Paper%20-%204%20November%20%283%29%20Amended%2023%20Feb
%202011.pdf; see
Blanaid Clarke, Lessons Learned – The Corporate Governance Code For
Credit Institutions and Insurance Undertakings, 33 DUBLIN U. L.J. 172–95 (2011) (festschrift for
Chief Justice Ronan Keane).
147. See, e.g., Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial Services Sector 2009/384, 2009 O.J. (L 120) 22.
148. See KURT VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE (1968).
149. Blanaid Clarke, Directors’ Duties in a Changing World: Lessons from the Cadbury Plc
Takeover, 7 EUR. COMPANY L. 204 (2010).
150. Press Release, Dep’t for Bus. Innovation & Skills, Cable Calls for Long Term Focus for
Corporate Britain (Sept. 22, 2010), available at http://news.bis.gov.uk/content/Detail.aspx?Release
ID=415572&NewsAreaID=2.
AND INSURANCE
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and other short-term investors owned almost 31% of the company’s
shares, up from just 5% before the offer was made. 151 Sir Roger Carr, the
Cadbury Chairman, commented that once it became clear that the company would not remain independent, his task was to achieve the highest
selling price for shareholders.152 This position was not altered by § 172
of the U.K. Companies Act 2006,153 which ostensibly promotes corporate
social responsibility by obliging directors to be aware of the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, the interests of the company’s employees, and the impact of the company’s operations on the
community and the environment.154 In June 2011, an independent review
was established under the chairmanship of Professor John Kay to consider whether U.K. equity markets provided sufficient support for British
industry’s capacity for innovation, its brands and reputations, and the
skills of its workforce. In an interim review, Kay noted that in its survey
of market participants, “there was wide agreement that the ability to
mount a successful takeover now depends almost solely on the capacity
and inclination to offer sufficient premium to the likely share price in the
absence of the bid.”155
The final report (Kay Report) similarly referred to the role of shortterm arbitrageurs whose sole purpose is to gamble on the bid being accepted, and noted:
If there is a problem, it is that the underlying holders of shares are
unwilling to reject an immediate offer at a premium to the previous
share price even if they believe that the still higher fundamental
value of the share will be revealed in the long-run. Or that they have
no idea of the fundamental value of the share, but take the money
and run.156
151. Roger Carr, Cadbury: Hostile Bids and Takeovers, UNIV. OF OXFORD
(Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/newsandevents/previousevents/Pages/RogerCarrCadbury.
aspx.
152. Id.
153. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (U.K.). Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006
provides that a director must “act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.”
154. See Andrew Keay, Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Law: Can It Survive? Should It
Survive?, 7 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 69 (2010); Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach,’
29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577 (2007).
155. See TOM KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION
MAKING: INTERIM REPORT (2012), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/businesslaw/docs/k/12-631-kay-review-of-equity-markets-interim-report.pdf.
156. Id. at 61. The Kay Review suggested that the development of stewardship activity by asset
managers is “the best – and probably the only – effective check on such actions.” It also advised the
U.K. government to adopt a more active approach toward companies planning major acquisitions of
U.K. businesses and to take a negative view of a transaction only in cases where at least one of the
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The Government responded positively to the Kay Report and accepted its
recommendation that “the scale and effectiveness of merger activity of
and by UK companies should be kept under careful review” by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills and by companies themselves.157 It also endorsed the call in the Kay Report’s “Good Practice
Statement for Company Directors” to “acknowledge that long-term value
creation in the interests of shareholders is best served by strategies which
focus on investing appropriately to deliver sustainable performance rather than treating the business as a portfolio of financial interests.”158
Klaus Hopt has described the MMC for banks as “especially
weak” noting that it “cannot be trusted to be a major disciplining force in
bank corporate governance.”159 While the Irish banking crisis has
demonstrated weaknesses in the MCC, it must be acknowledged that the
overvaluation of credit institutions by the markets prior to the crisis does
not justify discounting the theory completely. Demsetz’s nirvana fallacy160 warns against such a step. Similarly, Kuhn, the influential philosopher, has cautioned against imprudent abandonment of a theory simply
because an anomaly is present in its supporting data.161 Though one
might argue that the crisis has shown other forms of corporate governance and regulation to be imperfect, the MCC might still be considered
an important weapon in the agency-problem armory. We have accepted
other limitations to the theory in the past, and this may just be another
one to factor into our thinking.

following conditions was fulfilled: “the acquirer appeared to have significantly less capacity to manage the business than the existing management team; the combined concern appeared likely to be
substantially weaker financially than the existing UK business; a probable consequence of the transaction was a material loss of high level functions, or of employment from the UK.”
157. DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS, ENSURING EQUITY MARKETS
SUPPORT LONG TERM GROWTH: THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE KAY REVIEW 21 (2012),
available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/e/12-1188-equity-marketssupport-growth-response-to-kay-review.
158. Id. at 21.
159. Klaus Hopt, Corporate Governance of Banks After the Financial Crisis, in FINANCIAL
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS 342 (Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus Hopt &
Guido Ferrarini eds., 2012).
160. Demsetz explains this concept as follows: “The view that now pervades much public
policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing
‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a
comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional
arrangements.” See H. Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. L. & ECON. 1,
1 (1969).
161. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 81 (1970).

